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ABSTRACT
Despite abundant empirical evidence of informed trading ahead
of major corporate events, no such evidence has been reported
in the case of corporate spinoff (SP) announcements. This is
surprising, as SP announcements are unexpected, and are also
associated with a positive price jump in the parent company’s
stock. Using a sample of 280 U.S. announcement events from
1996 to 2013, we document significant pre-announcement in-
formed trading activity in options for about 9% to 16% of
events in our sample. In contrast, we find statistically insignif-
icant evidence of informed trading in stocks, suggesting that
informed traders employ leverage through options. In light of
the mixed evidence about the effect of SP announcements on
a parent firm’s credit risk and its debt, we also test for the exis-
tence of pre-announcement informed trading activity in bonds
and credit default swaps, but find no support for such a con-
clusion.
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While there is considerable evidence of informed trading ahead of a vari-
ety of corporate announcements in the academic and popular literature,
there is no reported evidence for the period preceding corporate spinoff
(SP) announcements, which pertain to the sale of a subsidiary or the di-
vision of a company as a separate entity. This is surprising since SPs are
generally publicly unexpected, largely unpredictable, and accompanied
by an upward jump in the parent firm’s stock price. Concurrently, there
may also be a drop in the parent’s bond prices, possibly due to a wealth
transfer from the parent’s bondholders to its shareholders (Maxwell and
Rao, 2003; Parrino, 1997), although the evidence on this occurrence is
mixed and debated (Hite and Owers, 1983; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova,
2008).1 The stock and (potentially) bond price reactions in opposite di-
rections make SPs unique, and allow for a joint hypothesis of informed
trading on multiple securities traded on the same firm.
The objective of our study is to explore the possibility of informed trad-
ing in corporate securities and derivative instruments associated with SP
announcements. In particular, we investigate and quantify the pervasive-
ness of informed trading, some of it possibly based on inside information,
in the context of SP activity in the United States (U.S.), using a sample of
280 SP announcement events from January 1996 to December 2013.
The study of informed trading is only relevant if there are economic
gains from trading on private information to begin with. The first step
in our research is, therefore, to revisit the evidence on cumulative ab-
normal returns (CARs) of parent companies’ stocks around SP announce-
ments. We document a statistically significant average CAR of approxi-
Research Conference, the NYU Stern Corporate Governance Luncheon, the National Uni-
versity of Singapore, McGill University, the Luxembourg School of Finance, the 2015 Lee
Kong Chian School of Business Summer Finance Research Camp, the Ninth NUS-RMI An-
nual Risk Management in Singapore, and the CIFR Conference on the Design and Regu-
lation of Securities Markets in Sydney for valuable feedback and discussions. This project
received support from the Canada Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant
435-2016-1504, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Augustin acknowledges financial
support from the Institute of Financial Mathematics of Montreal (IFM2).
1One prominent example is the sale by General Electric of its GE Capital division on
April 10, 2015, which led to a jump in the parent’s share price of nearly 11%, together with
a cut in GE’s debt rating by Moody’s Investors Services. See “GE Seeks Exit from Banking
Business,”The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2015.
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mately 1.62% to 2.53%. This is similar in magnitude to the price reaction
around earnings announcements (Foster et al., 1984) and is, therefore,
economically meaningful. The distribution of CARs is also right-skewed,
with many SP announcements recording CARs in excess of 5%.
We also investigate whether the positive CARs earned by the parent’s
shareholders are accompanied by negative CARs for the parent’s bondhold-
ers. This analysis is based on quote and transactions data on the parent
companies’ corporate bonds, and pricing information on the credit default
swap (CDS) spreads written on these bonds. We find no evidence of CARs
in the cash bonds of the parent firm. On the other hand, we find evi-
dence of positive CARs in the CDSs around SP announcements ranging
from 3.95% to 6.23%, reflecting an increase in credit risk. The evidence
for an increase in the parent’s credit risk following the SP announcement
is thus mixed.
We then examine trading in multiple securities based on different parts
of the firm’s capital structure, including stocks and bonds, as well as deriva-
tive instruments based upon them, such as equity options and CDS con-
tracts. Thus, we use SPs as a laboratory to test for the preferred trading
venue for informed traders across different types of cash and derivative
markets.
Given that companies may self-select into SPs, our tests may be biased
due to potential endogeneity. To mitigate this possibility, we build a SP pre-
diction model and construct a propensity-matched control sample in order
to compare abnormal trading activity in the sample of SPs (the treatment
group) with that of a control group that is optimally matched based on
company and industry characteristics and financial performance. We con-
struct two measures of informed trading following Acharya and Johnson,
2010, the so-called Sum and Max measures. Using various benchmark
regression models to capture “normal” volumes and returns in a three-
month estimation window preceding SP announcements, these measures
are computed using the sum of all positive (Sum) or the maximum of all
(Max) standardized residuals, over the five days immediately preceding
the announcement day. In other words, Sum and Max reflect abnormal
activity in both the stock and the options market, arising either from un-
usually large spikes in trading activity on individual days, or from large
CARs and volumes in the pre-event window.
Irrespective of the particular measure used, and the construction of the
control sample, we find robust evidence of informed trading in the equity
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options, but not in the stocks, of parent companies, in the five-day window
preceding corporate SP announcements. This trading activity is reflected
in abnormal options volume and excess implied volatility, although we find
little evidence of abnormal stock volume or abnormal stock returns. This
suggests that the options market is the preferred venue for informed in-
vestors in the context of SPs, perhaps due to its lower leverage-adjusted
transaction costs. In addition, we find that the abnormal options volume is
relatively larger for call options than for put options, in particular for out-
of-the-money (OTM) and at-the-money (ATM) call options. In an attempt
to quantify the pervasiveness of informed trading activity using different
benchmark models, we find that between 9% and 16% of all the announce-
ment events in our sample exhibit statistically significant abnormal options
activity in the pre-announcement period at the 5% significance level.
We also find that abnormal options activity in the pre-announcement
period is more pronounced in subsamples of divestitures that are, ex ante,
expected to have greater CARs. Thus, we find a greater degree of un-
usual options volume, for example, for SPs that are eventually completed,
for those instances where the divested company is operating in a differ-
ent industry than the parent, and for cases where the deal value reflects a
greater fraction of the market capitalization of the parent firm. Neverthe-
less, the differences across sub-samples sorted on deal characteristics are
not statistically significant.
The evidence that it is only abnormal pre-announcement options activ-
ity that positively and robustly predicts CARs offers additional support for
informed trading in the options market, but not in the stock market. While
the analysis of total volumes signals abnormal trading activity, we perform
a direct test on trading intentions to pinpoint the information content in
trading volumes. In a restricted sample of SP announcements, we confirm
our previous evidence using high-frequency, tick-by-tick data in the stock
and options markets. We find that net buying activity in the options mar-
ket, measured as the net difference between buyer- and seller-initiated op-
tion exposures to the underlying stock price (order flow imbalance), is sig-
nificantly greater in the treatment sample than in the propensity-matched
control group, while this is not the case for stock order imbalance.
We also examine the possibility that informed investors may trade in
the parent company’s bonds and CDS contracts prior to the SP announce-
ment. However, we find no statistically significant difference in the mea-
sures of informed trading, for the bond and CDS markets, between the SP
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sample and the propensity-matched control group. Thus, in the context of
corporate divestitures, the preferred venue for informed trading appears
to be the equity options market. This may be rationalized using a back-of-
the-envelope calculation, as being due to the trade-off between leverage
and transactions costs (liquidity), relative to other venues.
1 Literature Review and Contributions
Our work relates primarily to the empirical literature on informed trad-
ing around corporate announcements, including earnings announcements
(Patell and Wolfson, 1979; Patell and Wolfson, 1981; Billings and Jen-
nings, 2011; Kaniel et al., 2012; Jin et al., 2012; Goyenko et al., 2014),
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Cao et al., 2005; Chan et al., 2015; Au-
gustin et al., 2018; Lowry et al., 2018), bankruptcies (Ge et al., 2016),
the 9/11 terrorist attack (Poteshman, 2006), leveraged buyouts (Acharya
and Johnson, 2010), analyst recommendations (Hayunga and Lung, 2014;
Kadan et al., 2018), stock splits (Gharghori et al., 2017), and share re-
purchase announcements (Hao, 2016).2 The question of the venue where
informed investors trade has also been studied extensively, from a theoret-
ical perspective, taking into consideration asymmetric information (Easley
et al., 1998), differences in opinion (Cao and Ou-Yang, 2009), short-sale
constraints (Johnson and So, 2012), and margin requirements and wealth
constraints (John et al., 2003).
We provide three main contributions to the literature on informed trad-
ing. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first evidence of in-
formed trading in the period preceding SP announcements. By highlight-
ing another natural setting for testing the existence of informed trading,
we contribute to the academic and public debate on insider trading before
corporate events. Second, we examine informed trading across different
asset classes: stocks, options, bonds, and CDSs. Most studies on informed
trading cited above typically examine one asset class in isolation, apart
from Acharya and Johnson, 2010, who relate the likelihood of insider trad-
ing in debt and equity markets to the size of debt and equity syndicates
in leveraged buyouts. Third, we provide a methodological contribution as
we formally show under what assumptions the informed trading measures
2Bhattacharya, 2014 surveys the studies on insider trading.
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Sum and Max of Acharya and Johnson, 2010 can be used for statistical in-
ference.
We also contribute to the literature on a parent’s short-term stock price
reaction to corporate SP announcements, as we review the evidence from
earlier studies using a sample of 280 unique event days over the 1996 to
2013 sample period. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2009 summarize the re-
sults of 26 studies with research periods ranging between 1962 and 2005.
They report the CARs to be 3.01% on average, and ranging from 1.32% to
5.56%.
Multiple reasons have been put forth to rationalize positive excess re-
turns, including enhanced investment efficiency of the parent (Ahn and
Denis, 2004), contracting efficiency (Hite and Owers, 1983), an improve-
ment in operating performance (John and Ofek, 1995), a wealth trans-
fer from bondholders to shareholders (Maxwell and Rao, 2003; Veld and
Veld-Merkoulova, 2008), an improved allocation of capital (Gertner et al.,
2002), reversals of value destruction from earlier acquisitions (Miles and
Rosenfeld, 1983; Allen et al., 1995), industry focus (John and Ofek, 1995;
Daley et al., 1997; Dasilas et al., 2011), reduced information asymme-
try (Habib et al., 1997; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Martin
and Sayrak, 2003), and tax and regulatory considerations (Schipper and
Smith, 1983; Copeland et al., 1987). Across these studies, the results tend
to be stronger for larger deals (Klein, 1986) and deals that are not com-
pleted. The argument for industry focus is closely tied to the conclusion
of a conglomerate discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995), which has been con-
firmed by several researchers (Burch and Nanda, 2003; Laeven and Levine,
2007; Hoechle et al., 2012; Lamont and Polk, 2002), but was also chal-
lenged (Custodio, 2014).
2 Data and Spinoff Announcement Returns: Evidence Revisited
We begin by revisiting the evidence on the CARs around announcements
of corporate SPs in the U.S. We obtain the SP sample from the Thomson
Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum Database (SDC) for the Jan-
uary 1 1996, to December 31, 2013 period. The start date of our sample
is dictated by the availability of options data. We source all corporate SPs
with a U.S. parent company from the domestic M&A dataset in SDC, yield-
ing a total of 1,165 SP announcements that correspond to 1,105 unique
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event days during our sample period.3 We then remove deals that are
flagged with a pending or unknown status, and retain only public par-
ent companies with matching stock price information in the Center for
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. In order to avoid the con-
founding effects of multiple events for the same parent company, we re-
quire that no other SP divestiture announcement occurred within a three-
month window prior to the event; if this was the case, we only keep the
first occurrence in our sample. The combination of these selection criteria
generates a sample of 446 corporate SP transactions, reflecting 426 unique
event days during our sample period.
To construct propensity-matched control groups for our analyses, we
also require information about the stock and option prices and volumes, as
well as firm characteristics. Therefore, we extract daily price and volume
information for stocks from CRSP, for options from OptionMetrics, and
balance sheet information from Compustat, resulting in a sample of 295
SPs and 280 unique event days during our sample period.
Table 1 provides the number of corporate SP announcements by cal-
endar year, as well as statistics on the transaction values of the SP com-
panies. Specific information on the deal value is available for 186 of the
deals (63%). There were a greater number of divestitures in the 1990s,
with a low of 24 in 1996, and a peak of 36 in 2000; there was more muted
SP activity after 2001, ranging from 4 per year in 2004 to 20 per year in
2011. For the average divestiture, the size, measured by market volume,
is approximately $4.1 billion. However, there is a large degree of cross-
sectional variation, reflected in an average sample standard deviation of
$11.5 billion. The smallest divestiture has a value of $3.4 million and cor-
responds to the SP by General Magic Inc. of its Data Rover division in
1998. The largest deal in the sample is by Altria Group Inc. of Kraft Foods
Inc. on August 29, 2007 and valued at $107.6 billion. Out of the 295 deals
in our sample, 136 (71) deals/46% (24%) have the divested subsidiary in
the same industry as the parent company, as characterized by the two-
digit (four-digit) SIC code. There are 121 deals (41%) whose divested
subsidiary is in a different state than the parent company’s headquarters.
3If a parent company spins off several subsidiaries/divisions on the same day, we count
them as one event and aggregate their deal values. The subsidiary industry is coded to
be different from the parent if any of the subsidiaries is in a different industry than the
parent. The physical distance associated with the event is assigned the largest distance
between the headquarters of the parent and any of its subsidiaries.
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For a subsample of events, we also require information on order flows,
and extract tick-by-tick price and volume information for stocks from the
NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ), and for options from the Option Price Re-
porting Authority (OPRA). The OPRA data from Trade Alert LLC. is avail-
able only since April 2006. These additional requirements reduce the sam-
ple size to 94 deals from 2006 to 2013. We use this smaller sample only for
the order imbalance tests, while our main analysis of informed trading is
based on a larger sample of 280 events for which the parents have traded
options.
Maxwell and Rao, 2003 document that bondholders experience, on
average, a negative abnormal return of 88 basis points (bps) during the
month of the SP announcement, while Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008,
who find positive bond CARs of 0.11% over a three-day event window,
argue that large negative numbers may be due to outliers. We thus re-
view the evidence on the negative CARs on the parent company’s debt
around SP announcements, using information from both the cash and the
derivative fixed income markets. For the cash market, we obtain company
identifiers from Mergent FISD, which allow us to match all parent com-
panies in our sample with bond transactions information from the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).
A few comments about our sample size are in order. Given that liq-
uidity in the corporate bond market is comparatively much lower than in
the stock market, we identify only 49 parent firms with active bond is-
sues in the estimation window around the announcements. While this is
seemingly a modest-sized sample, it compares favorably with that of Ke-
dia and Zhou, 2014, who only have a sample of 329 bonds issued by 123
firms in the context of (more frequent) M&As, and Acharya and Johnson,
2010, who examine only 34 private equity buyouts. As our sample size is
modest, we also source daily bond quote data from Bloomberg and Datas-
tream, for which we can match the company identifiers with 52 and 37
announcements, respectively, providing us with a slightly larger sample.
For the fixed income derivatives market, we rely on CDS data from
Markit. We use the most liquid five-year senior unsecured CDS spreads
and report results based on the modified restructuring (MR) clause, given
that it used to be the standard North American contract, by convention,
prior to the Big Bang Protocol in 2009.4 We identify 54 firms with valid
4See Augustin et al., 2014 for details. Results using contracts with the no-restructuring
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CDS quote information around the SP announcements during the 1996 to
2013 sample period.
2.1 Abnormal announcement returns for stocks
We first compute, for the parent companies, the CARs around SP announce-
ments for the 280 unique SP event days in our sample. We use the Fama
and French, 1993 three-factor model (FF3F), which includes the market
return (Rm), as well as the market-to-book factor (MB), and the high-
minus low size factor (HML), but also report results for the nested mar-
ket model that only includes the market return. More specifically, for each
SP, we first compute abnormal returns (ARi,t) as the regression residuals
from the projection of realized returns Ri,t on expected normal returns,
i.e., ARi,t = Ri,t − αˆi − βˆiRm,t − γˆiMBt − δˆiHMLt . All parameters of the
expected return model (α, β , γ, and δ) are estimated over an estimation
window [T1, T2] running from t = −252 to t = −21 relative to the an-
nouncement day, which is defined as day τ = 0. Parent-specific ARs are
then aggregated over different event windows [τ1,τ2] to obtain CARs, de-
fined as CARi (τ1,τ2) =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ARi t . Specifically, we examine the CARs on
the announcement day, as well as the following event windows, [-1,0], [-
1,1], [-1,2], [-1,5], and [-1,10]. Inference is based on the cross-sectional
average CAR, defined as CAR (τ1,τ2) =
N∑
i=1
CARi (τ1,τ2)/N , where N de-
notes the number of unique SP event days.5
In Table 2, we show that unconditional CARs are always statistically
significant, across event-windows, at the 1% or 5% significance level, ex-
cept for the ten-day CARs using the market and the FF3F models (signif-
icant at the 10% significance level) and the five-day CAR using the FF3F
model. Apart from the longer-horizon metrics reported in columns (5) and
(6), the lowest CAR is 1.62% for the announcement day using the FF3F-
adjusted returns, but it is as high as 2.53% in the three-day event window
[-1,1] using the market model. Although these values are not as large in
(XR) clause, which became the standard North American contract after the Big Bang Pro-
tocol, are quantitatively similar.
5We find similar results using (1) a four-factor model that includes the Carhart, 1997
momentum factor, and (2) alternative estimation windows following Kothari and Warner,
2007.
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magnitude as for targets of tender offers in M&As, they are sizable and eco-
nomically similar to the numbers reported for average CARs surrounding
positive earnings announcements (Foster et al., 1984), another common
corporate announcement. Looking at the distribution of the FF3F CARs
on the announcement day in Figure 1, it can be seen that the distribution
is right-skewed, with a substantial fraction of events having positive CARs
of 5% or higher. The majority of events have positive CARs, but there are
also a number of events with negative CARs.
Our findings confirm previous evidence of positive economic gains
earned by the shareholders of parent companies upon the announcement
of a corporate divestiture (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2009). Earlier stud-
ies have highlighted cross-sectional differences in short-term CARs that are
associated with company characteristics. However, our (unreported) ex-
amination lends no statistical support for the conclusion that CARs are sig-
nificantly higher for cross-industry SPs [conglomerate discount (Burch and
Nanda, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2007)] or completed deals. Despite the
idea that proximity facilitates information acquisition and reduces mon-
itoring costs (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001;
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Mian, 2006; Sufi, 2007; Lerner, 1995; Giroud,
2013), we find no evidence that co-location in the same state and/or geo-
graphical distance affects CARs. There is some support for the notion that
CARs are greater when the enterprise value of the subsidiary represents
a larger fraction of the parent (Hite and Owers, 1983). In our sample,
the average (median) SP accounts for approximately 35% (25%) of the
parent’s market capitalization.
2.2 Abnormal announcement returns for bonds
Since bonds trade only infrequently, we follow Acharya and Johnson, 2010
and form bond portfolios using all outstanding bonds of the same firm,
weighted by issue size, to compute their daily returns. All returns include
accrued coupon interest, where the information on coupon structures is
obtained from FISD. For the fixed income announcement effects based
on the derivative market, we compute the simple difference in logs, i.e.,
RET CDSt,t+1 = ln(CDSt+1)− ln(CDSt), given that these provide a reasonably
good approximation (Hilscher et al., 2015). As an alternative measure,
we compute daily holding period excess returns following Lee et al., 2016.
This CDS return, from the perspective of a protection buyer, is calculated
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as the change in CDS spreads multiplied by the risky present value of a
basis point, RET CDSt,t+1 = (CDSt+1 − CDSt) ·RPV01t,t+1, where RPV01t,t+1
fully incorporates all accrued premium payments.
In Panels B, C, and D of Table 2, we report the results for cash bonds us-
ing the TRACE, Datastream, and Bloomberg data, respectively. The CARs
range from -0.08% to -0.03% on the announcement day, and from -1.18%
to 0.36% for the other event windows. However, we find that none of the
test statistics is statistically significant. The theoretically equivalent coun-
terpart of a corporate bond spread is a CDS spread (Duffie, 1999), which
is often based on a more liquid market and generally leads the cash mar-
ket in price discovery. We, thus, compare our cash bond results with those
obtained using simple and “clean” CDS price returns in Panels E and F of
Table 2. For simple returns, the CAR is 6.23% on the announcement day,
statistically significant at the 5% level, and ranges from 4.54% to 6.01%
across the other event windows. For “clean” price returns, the magnitude
of the CAR on the announcement-day decreases slightly to 4.79%, and
the CARs fluctuate between 3.95% and 4.87% throughout the other event
windows. The test statistics are mostly significant at either the 5% or 10%
level. As positive CDS returns indicate an increase in credit risk, these re-
sults reflect negative returns for investors with a long credit risk exposure
towards the parent firm.
We thus find mixed evidence of CARs in the fixed income market.
While the insignificant bond results are more consistent with Veld and
Veld-Merkoulova, 2008 and Hite and Owers, 1983, the CDS results appear
to be consistent with Maxwell and Rao, 2003, who suggest that economic
gains from divestitures accruing to shareholders may reflect an expropri-
ation of shareholder wealth. As the results are mixed, we study the pre-
ferred venue for informed trading across cash and derivative markets, for
both equity and debt.
3 Informed Trading before Corporate Divestitures
We first discuss our research questions and hypotheses (Subsection 3.1).
We then provide some preliminary evidence on pre-announcement informed
trading activity (Subsection 3.2), illustrate how we measure informed trad-
ing (Subsection 3.3), and discuss the construction of propensity-matched
control groups for the main part of the analysis (Subsection 3.4).
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3.1 Research questions
Corporate SP announcements are normally unexpected and typically exert
a positive effect on the stock price of the parent, just as the price of the
target goes up in response to an M&A announcement, albeit by a lower
magnitude, and with somewhat less certainty. Despite substantial anec-
dotal evidence of informed trading prior to M&A announcements, there is
paucity of evidence for corporate divestitures, even though the nature or
private information is similar in both cases and well identified. Thus, we
investigate the presence of informed trading ahead of SP announcements.
We are also interested in investigating where informed investors trade.
Easley et al., 1998 model informed traders’ choice between the stock and
options markets in the presence of asymmetric information. They show
that, under certain conditions, some investors will choose to trade in the
options market. Mixed trading strategies in both the stock and options
markets may also arise in the presence of margin requirements and lever-
age constraints (John et al., 2003). Cao and Ou-Yang, 2009 and Johnson
and So, 2012 suggest that options trading should be concentrated around
information events, while Cao et al., 2005 show that the options market
displaces the stock market as a venue for informed trading ahead of M&As.
The positive CARs are typically smaller for SPs than for M&As. Thus, we
expect that informed investors have a stronger motive to trade in the op-
tions market, as they would benefit more from the leverage effect obtained
from options trading.
Given that the stock prices of parent companies typically rise after SP
announcements, we examine whether the evidence is consistent with di-
rectional trading in the options market. The simplest way to implement
a levered directional trading strategy is to purchase plain vanilla call op-
tions. Hence, we test for the presence of unusual activity in the options
market for both call and put options. As there is more uncertainty about
the magnitude of a SP CAR, an informed trader may trade less out-of-the-
money (OTM) calls compared to a case where (s)he is more certain about
a large announcement effect. Thus, we also examine whether there is a
relatively greater amount of abnormal trading volume in OTM than ATM
or ITM call options, given that OTM call options provide greater lever-
age than an equal dollar investment in either an ATM or ITM call option.
Leverage is a relevant consideration for a wealth-constrained investor, who
cannot borrow easily.
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The evidence on fixed income SP CARs is mixed, both in the litera-
ture (Maxwell and Rao, 2003; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008) and in
our sample. We, therefore, examine pre-announcement informed trading
activity for the parent’s bonds and CDSs. We find no statistical support
for either positive or negative CARs for parents’ cash bonds, but we do for
CDS contracts. This may be due to the leverage they offer, especially as it
is more difficult and expensive to short bonds than it is to short stocks.
3.2 Preliminary evidence of informed trading
To provide preliminary evidence on pre-announcement informed trading
activity across asset classes, in Figure 2, we plot the CARs and excess
implied volatility (a metric of the option “return”), computed using the
FF3F model as a benchmark, over the 20-day period preceding the SP an-
nouncements. The figure displays no discernable pattern of unusuable
pre-announcement activity in stocks, bonds, or CDSs. On the other hand,
there is a pronounced run-up in the measure of cumulative excess implied
volatility. These findings lend support to the conclusion of unusual pre-
announcement activity in options, but not in stocks, bonds, or CDSs.
3.3 Measuring informed trading
To measure informed trading activity in stock and options markets ahead
of corporate SP announcements, we follow Acharya and Johnson, 2010,
and construct the Sum and Max measures, two measures of informed trad-
ing designed to capture unusual and suspect activity in the stock and op-
tions markets. The Sum and Max measures are, intuitively speaking, met-
rics of abnormal volume and returns, computed relative to a benchmark
model that predicts expected returns and volume in a two-stage proce-
dure. To capture unusual price effects in the options market, and to study
excess implied volatility, we use the average implied volatility of the 30-
day ATM call and put options from OptionMetrics. More precisely, in the
first stage, we fit for each of our variables a normal regression model over
the 90-day pre-announcement window to compute normal returns, similar
to what we did for abnormal returns as described in Subsection 2.1: the
conditional model contains a constant, day-of-week dummies, lagged re-
turns, and volume, as well as contemporaneous returns and volume of the
S&P500 Index. In addition, we account for lagged values of the dependent
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and all independent variables and the VIX price index. We explored other
less conservative models, which mostly yield stronger results, suggesting
that our findings are conservative.6 We use only pre-announcement infor-
mation in order to not confound the measures of informed trading with
activity arising from the announcement effect itself.
In the second stage, we standardize the residuals from the normal re-
turn regression using the standard deviation of all residuals. The stan-
dardized residuals from the five-day period immediately preceding the SP
announcement day are used to compute the Sum and Max measures. The
deal-specific Sum measure is constructed by aggregating all positive stan-
dardized residuals over the five days, while the deal-specific Max measure
uses only the maximum of all standardized residuals over the same time
period. Both measures are sensitive to different types of informed trading.
Max will pick up “spikes,” which are days with exceptionally large ab-
normal trading and/or returns, and implied volatility, respectively. Sum,
on the other hand, is more sensitive to “sustained unusual activity” when
there are several successive days with abnormal returns and volumes in
the pre-event window. In the analysis, we use the Sum and Max measures
to test for the presence of informed trading in stock and options markets
ahead of SP announcements. In Figure 3, we report the distribution of the
Sum and Max measures derived from the information on options volume.
The distribution is far from normal, and closely resembles a heavy-tailed
distribution with a substantial amount of weight in the far right tail.7
3.4 Predicting spinoffs
There are often waves in financial markets, in which specific financial
strategies gain popularity, such as takeovers (Andrade et al., 2001), lever-
aged buyouts, or similar corporate activities. Similarly, there are time
trends in corporate divestitures, which make it challenging for researchers
to differentiate truly informed trading from random speculation. In addi-
tion, some investors may have superior forecasting ability, which will allow
6Our results are robust to the inclusion of weekly dummies to control for the possibility
that option volumes, prices, and bid-ask spreads behave differently in the week before
expiration.
7A simulation of the Sum andMax metrics using standard normally distributed random
variables confirms that the in-sample Sum and Max metrics, for our case, have many more
observations in the right tail of the distribution, compared to the random, independently
and identically distributed normal benchmark.
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them to predict an upcoming SP announcement better than other mar-
ket participants. In such a case, we may naturally expect a higher level
of trading activity that could be amplified through herding behavior and
momentum trading, without necessarily any direct evidence of informed
trading. While some investors may be accurate forecasters of corporate
SPs, they may not necessarily be able to forecast the exact time of the an-
nouncements. Thus, as we examine abnormal trading activity during a
short period immediately preceding public announcements, such a possi-
bility would effectively make it more difficult for us to conclude that our
results are due to informed trading, as we would measure abnormal activ-
ity relative to a higher predicted benchmark of normal activity.
In order to address the above selection and endogeneity concerns, we
construct a control sample of firms that would be likely to implement a SP,
but that did not effectively sell a subsidiary or division during the sample
period. More precisely, we construct a propensity-matched control sample
based on a SP prediction model. Roberts and Whited, 2012 explain how
the propensity-score matching technique conditions the estimation on the
probability of receiving treatment, such as being part of the SP sample,
conditional on the observable covariates. This effectively results in ran-
domization, whereby the potential outcomes are assumed to be indepen-
dent of the assignment into the treatment and control groups, respectively.
To construct the SP prediction model, we use the universe of North
American Compustat firms from 1996 to 2013 that have complete quar-
terly information for the balance sheet items total assets, total liabilities,
and market capitalization. We further require all companies to have valid
stock price information in CRSP. This results in a total of 18,402 compa-
nies with an equivalent of 577,466 firm-quarter observations. We con-
struct the variable SPIN , which takes on the value one in a quarter in
which the parent spins off a subsidiary, and zero in all other quarters. Us-
ing a vector of observable covariates X containing information on firms’
balance sheets, corporate governance, industry characteristics, and stock
and options trading, we predict SPs with a logistic regression specified as
Prob (SPIN = 1) = 1/ (1+ exp (−α− Xβ)).
In all our tests, we compare the outcomes of informed trading activity
between the treatment and control groups, where the treatment group is
based on our sample of SP events, and the control group is constructed
based on non-SP firm-quarter observations that have the closest match to
the treatment group in terms of their propensity scores. Given our focus
16 Augustin et al.
on the abnormal activity in both the stock and options markets, we require
both treatment and control observations to have valid stock and options
price and volume information, at the time of the announcement, although
the predictive logistic regression is estimated over the full sample. As an
alternative matching procedure, we also estimate the logistic model over
the subsample of company-quarters with available stock and options in-
formation (we impose the filter before running the logistic regression),
and construct control samples based on the propensity scores. The logistic
regression results are not qualitatively different from the benchmark mod-
els. We use both the closest and the two closest matches for both the full
sample and the restricted options sample, which produces four control
groups. We define the treatment group to be PS0, and the propensity-
matched control groups to be PS1 if the control group includes only the
first best match, and PS2 if it includes the two best matches.
Table A-1 in the Appendix presents the sample characteristics of the
treatment group and the propensity-matched control groups. The sample
statistics in each group resemble each other closely, and the differences
are not statistically significant, except in the case of retained earnings di-
vided by total assets. This evidence confirms that the propensity-matched
control samples are closely matched to the treatment group.
4 Evidence of Pre-Announcement Informed Trading
In this section, we first examine informed trading activity in stocks and
options in the period preceding SP announcements (Subsection 4.1), and
attempt to quantify this activity (Subsection 4.2). We then examine in-
formed trading in call and put options of different degrees of moneyness
(Subsection 4.3), and in subsamples split by parent firm characteristics
(Subsection 4.4). We also provide an examination of informed trading in
the parent firms’ stocks and options using intra-day data (Subsection 4.5),
and investigate the predictability of CARs using informed trading mea-
sures (Subsection 4.6). After we examine informed trading activity in the
parent firms’ corporate bonds and related CDS contracts (Subsection 4.7),
we discuss our results (Subsection 4.8).
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4.1 Where do informed investors trade in the equity market?
We report the results for the measures of informed trading in Table 3.
All our conclusions are based on the treatment effects. We conclude in
favor of informed trading activity if the measures of informed trading are
greater in the treatment sample than in the propensity-matched control
sample. We find significant evidence of informed trading activity in the
options market, but less evidence in the stock market. The option results
are robust for both price and volume measures, across the different control
samples, and for both the Sum and Max measures that proxy for informed
trading. Comparing abnormal volume or returns relative to a propensity-
matched control sample is conceptually akin to a differences-in-differences
specification, where we control for both firm characteristics and time.8
Panel A.1 of Table 3 reports the results for abnormal stock returns.
As the Sum and Max measures are constructed using standardized resid-
uals, we can interpret them in units of standard deviation. The difference
in the Sum and Max measures between the treatment and control group
ranges between 0.09 and 0.38 standard deviations. While we do find sig-
nificant differences between the treatment and control groups for stock
returns, these findings (unreported) are not robust across different types
of model specifications. The evidence that parent companies have larger
abnormal announcement returns that are significantly higher than those
of a propensity-matched control sample is, thus, mixed. More importantly,
for the results in Panel A.2, we find no evidence that abnormal stock trad-
ing volume in the treatment sample is significantly different from that in
the control sample.
In contrast to the results for stocks, we find significant evidence of in-
formed trading activity in options ahead of SP announcements. In Panels
A.3 and A.4 of Table 3, we report the results for excess implied volatil-
ity and options volume. The findings in both panels support that, in the
treatment sample, there is abnormal options volume and excess implied
volatility that is significantly greater than in the propensity-matched con-
trol sample. The results are consistently significant, mostly at the 1% level,
8We formally show in the Internet Appendix Section A that the treatment effects on
Max i and Sumi (the differences of these measures between the treatment and control
groups), converge toward a normal distribution with zero mean under the Lindeberg-Levy
Central Limit Theoreom, because the treatment effect has zero mean and finite variance.
This allows the use of the Student t-test for statistical inference.
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and are not dependent on the sample involved, or the method used for con-
structing the control group. The average difference in the Sum and Max
measures between the treatment and control groups ranges between 0.16
and 0.66 standard deviations for implied volatility, and between 0.25 and
0.46 standard deviations for options volume.
We find strong evidence of informed trading activity in options, but
weaker support for stocks, in the five-day window preceding the SP an-
nouncements. This confirms the conjecture discussed in Subsection 3.1.
One plausible explanation for the difference could be the limited risk fea-
ture of options, rather than just the leverage argument. In the case of SPs,
even a well-informed trader would be uncertain about the precise effect
on the stock price, specifically as to whether or not it will increase, and if
so, by how much. Depending on the determination, a trader would buy
call options rather than stocks (but not at a high leverage ratio, i.e., closer
to ITM), if (s)he was sure about the magnitude and sign of the increase in
the stock price. Unlike the M&A case, where a well-informed trader can
pick the option strike and maturity that provides a high leverage, in the
SP case, the trader’s choice of the option series is more risky. Hence, a
risk-averse agent will probably pick one with a high probability of ending
up ITM, assuming that (s)he wants to play it safe.
In Panel B of Table 3, we report the results for the call and put options.
While the most straightforward way to bet on a rise in the parent’s stock
price is to buy a plain vanilla call option, an investor could also replicate
this strategy by buying the stock and a put. Such a strategy is, however,
less likely if the investor is capital constrained. While the results indicate
greater unusual activity in both call and put options, the magnitudes of
the differences between the treatment and control groups are consistently
larger for call options. The average differences in the Sum (Max) mea-
sures between the treatment and control groups range between 0.15 and
0.28 (0.27 and 0.53) standard deviations for call volume, and between
0.06 and 0.24 (0.12 and 0.37) standard deviations for put volume. The
differences are significant for call volume, yet often insignificant for put
volume. This confirms our prior of greater abnormal volume in call op-
tions, due to greater leverage provided by call options for some informed
traders, and the downside protection for the more conservative informed
traders.9
9We verified all of our results using delta-adjusted stock volume, as well as the com-
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If investors are truly informed, they should be able to differentiate
between those events with negative versus positive abnormal announce-
ment returns. Given that the distribution of abnormal announcement re-
turns contains both positive and negative values (see Figure 1), we sepa-
rately examine pre-announcement abnormal call and put options volume
activity in Panels B.3 and B.4 of Table 3, conditioning on the sign of the
announcement return. We find that the abnormal options activity in the
pre-announcement period is primarily driven by abnormal call options vol-
ume for those announcements that are associated with positive abnormal
stock returns, as all test statistics in Panel B.3 are consistently significant
at either the 1% or 5% significance level.10 We did not find any significant
evidence of pre-announcement abnormal options activity for SP announce-
ments that are associated with negative stock performance, and hence do
not report them.
4.2 Quantifying informed trading
After documenting supportive evidence of informed trading in options,
we attempt to quantify how many of these SP events are prone to insider
trading. In Panel A of Table 4, we report the fraction of the sample, in
percentage terms, that exhibits statistically significant abnormal trading
volume. Using a more conservative out-of-sample test, we find that ap-
proximately 9% of all SP events exhibit unusual trading activity in the
pre-announcement period at the 5% statistical significance level.11 The
reported results are based on the most conservative model. Using the
same model as in Acharya and Johnson, 2010, we find (in unreported
results) that there is abnormal trading activity in approximately 13% of
all SP events at the 5% significance level, and in 16% of all events if we
use a simple constant mean benchmark model.
ponent of stock volume that is orthogonal to the contemporaneous options volume (the
regression residual of the stock volume on the options volume). These robustness tests sep-
arate the influences of options trading from the volume of stock trading. Our conclusion
of informed trading in options, but not in stocks, does not change.
10In Panel B.4 of Table 3, there is some evidence of abnormal pre-announcement activ-
ity in put options, but it is weaker and not robust across tests.
11By out-of-sample test, we mean that we calculate abnormal options volume in event
days -5 to -1 in excess of the average options volume from event days -63 to -6 (three
months). The cumulative abnormal options volume is the sum of the abnormal volumes
from days -5 to -1.
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To be even more cautious with our interpretation, we report in Panel
B of Table 4 the number of treatment firms with abnormal options volume
in excess of a randomly matched control group, expressed as a percentage
of the total sample, and using both the Sum and Max measures. At the
5% significance level, we find that about 5% of all SP events appear to be
prone to insider trading.
4.3 Leverage vs. liquidity
We also partition the options sample by moneyness to better understand
where informed investors trade. A priori, OTM call options provide rel-
atively greater leverage than ATM and ITM call options. However, in
addition to choosing between the stock and the options markets to ex-
press his/her views, an investor must also trade off greater leverage for
lower market liquidity and the uncertainty of the outcome. As deep OTM
(DOTM) options are typically less liquid, an unusual size may alert the
market maker (and the regulators, if illegal), and, if traded, may be more
easily detected. Furthermore, we provide evidence that, although the par-
ent’s stock price consistently rises upon the SP announcement, the mag-
nitude of the price increase is not as strong as in the case of targets in a
tender offer. Thus, the further OTM the option, the less likely it is that the
gain will be pocketed.
We classify call and put options into different moneyness/depth cate-
gories. Moneyness is defined as S/K , the ratio of the stock price S to the
strike price K . DOTM corresponds to S/K ∈ [0, 0.80] for calls ( [1.20,∞)
for puts), OTM corresponds to S/K ∈ (0.80, 0.95] for calls ([1.05,1.20)
for puts), ATM is defined by S/K ∈ (0.95,1.05) for calls ( (0.95, 1.05) for
puts), ITM is defined by S/K ∈ [1.05, 1.20) for calls ((0.80,0.95] for puts),
and DITM corresponds to S/K ∈ [1.20,∞) for calls ([0,0.80] for puts).
All results are reported in Panels C and D of Table 3 for call and put op-
tions, respectively. Due to insufficient liquidity, we do not report results
for DITM calls and DOTM puts.
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that the abnormal call options
volume is consistently statistically greater in the treatment group than in
the control group only for the OTM and ATM categories, as suggested by
the values reported in Panels C.2 and C.3 of Table 3. Irrespective of the
specification, the t-test results for the difference in means is statistically
significant, mostly at the 1% or 5% levels. In contrast, the results are sta-
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tistically insignificant for DOTM call options and comparatively weaker
for ITM call options, as reported in Panels C.1 and C.4 respectively (in
unreported tests, we find that results depend on the nature of the control
sample and the model). This confirms our conjecture that informed in-
vestors prefer to trade in “out-of but near-the-money” call options. Again,
this is in contrast to the M&A case, where there is much more trading in
DOTM and OTM options than in ATM and ITM options, due to the greater
potential jump in price and the certainty that informed traders would have
regarding the outcome (Augustin et al., 2018). We also examine the cross-
sectional differences for put options. In Panel D of Table 3, there is no evi-
dence of unusual activity in either ATM or ITM options. Also, in Panel D.4,
we do not observe statistically significant differences between the treat-
ment and control groups for the DITM put option category. Surprisingly,
in Panel D.1, we find significant differences across treatment and control
groups for OTM put options. These results could be due to the uncertainty
of the outcome (the possibility that the stock price will decline after the
announcement). An informed trader, therefore, would prefer a low-risk
strategy and sell OTM rather than ITM puts, which carry a higher exercise
risk that is at the discretion of the counterparty.
4.4 Informed trading and deal characteristics
The earlier studies highlighted cross-sectional differences in SP CARs as-
sociated with deal characteristics. Even though we do not find significant
cross-sectional differences in our sample, insiders could base their actions
on the results from previous studies, which consistently reported higher
CARs associated with cross-industry SPs or larger SPs. Accordingly, we
verify whether there is evidence of greater unusual options activity within
subsamples that we split along different dimensions of deal characteristics.
In Table 5, we report the treatment effects for the measures of ab-
normal options volume, as well as the differences between the treatment
effects in the subgroups, conditioning on deal characteristics. We find sta-
tistically significant and greater measures of unusual options trading ac-
tivity in the samples of completed deals (Panel A), diversified SPs (Panel
B), larger deals (Panel C), and deals that are ex ante considered to have a
lower conglomerate discount (Panel E). On the other hand, the informed
trading measures are statistically insignificant, and of a much smaller mag-
nitude, in the samples of withdrawn deals (Panel A), focused SPs (Panel
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B), smaller deals (Panel C), and deals that are ex ante considered to have
a high conglomerate discount (Panel E). Only the results in Panel D of Ta-
ble 5, which exhibit greater magnitudes for the Sum and Max measures
are, to some extent, inconsistent with the findings of greater CARs for
divested companies that are incorporated at a lesser distance from the
parent’s headquarters. However, the differences across groups are not sta-
tistically significant, based on the results in columns (5) and (6).
4.5 Order-flow imbalances and high-frequency trading data
The previous evidence of unusual activity in the options market, but not
in the stock market, is based on daily price and unsigned volume informa-
tion. To ensure that the abnormal activity is in the direction of advance
information about the forthcoming events, we also examine order flows in
stocks and options ahead of SP announcements using more high-frequency
trading data.12 While this has the benefit of providing more targeted evi-
dence of unusual trading activity, we unfortunately have this information
only for a shorter time period and, therefore, have a more restricted sam-
ple size (94 SPs) after merging the sample with options tick data from
OPRA for the 2005 to 2013 period.
We follow Hu, 2014 and construct a measure for options order im-
balance (OOI) and a measure of stock order imbalance (SOI). We assume
that options market makers consistently delta hedge their stock exposures
fully, and that customers actively seek delta exposure (they do not hedge).
Intuitively speaking, our measure of option order flow imbalance reflects
the net difference between customer buy and sell delta-adjusted option
volumes. More formally, for each stock i on day t, we construct OOI as:
OOIi,t =
n∑
j=1
100Diri,t, j ·δi,t, j · sizei,t, j
Num_shares_outstandingi
, (1)
where Diri,t, j is an indicator variable equal to one (minus one), if the jth
option trade is a buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trade. The direction of
12As a robustness check, in unreported tests, we also examined abnormal order im-
balances in the options market using the signed options volume data available from the
International Securities Exchange (ISE). These results indicate that, in the period preced-
ing SP announcements, firms open more long call and short put positions compared to a
normal benchmark period.
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the trade is based on the Lee and Ready, 1991 algorithm without applying
any delay for quotes. The option’s delta δi,t, j denotes the sensitivity of the
option price to a change in the underlying stock price, and sizei,t, j denotes
the number of contracts for each trade. We scale the numerator by the total
number of shares outstanding, and we multiply it by 100, given that each
option contract is for a lot of 100 shares.
In order to obtain a measure of net SOI that is independent of OOI,
we subtract OOI from the total order imbalance (TOI) in the stock market.
Formally, we calculate:
SOIi,t = TOIi,t −OOIi,t =
n∑
j=1
Diri,t, j · sizei,t, j
Num_shares_outstandingi
−OOIi,t , (2)
where Diri,t, j and sizei,t, j refer to the direction and size of the jth stock
trade.13 Thus, SOI is the stock order imbalance that is caused purely by
stock market investors, and not the result of possible hedging demand due
to order imbalance in the options market. Intuitively, SOI measures the net
difference between buyer- and seller-initiated stock volumes, scaled by the
number of shares outstanding.
In Table 6, we report the statistics on the measures of informed trading,
calculated using abnormal SOI and OOI, for the differences between the
treatment and control groups. The results are largely consistent with our
previous evidence of greater unusual activity in the options market than
in the stock market. Unconditionally, the differences in abnormal volumes
between the treatment and control groups are smaller for the order-flow
imbalance in the stock market than in the options market. The values
for Sum (Max) range between 0.06 and 0.13 (0.07 and 0.21) standard
deviations for SOI, and between 0.22 and 0.32 (0.25 and 0.38) standard
deviations for OOI (note that abnormal OOI is delta-adjusted). However,
the SOI in the treatment group is not always statistically different from
that in the propensity-matched control group based on observable firm
characteristics. In unreported results, we also find that the difference in
abnormal OOI between the treatment and control groups is consistently
13We apply a five-second delay in quote prices until 1998, and no delay afterward when
assigning trade directions, because the recording lag is not observed in the recent sample
period as noted by Madhavan et al., 2005 and Chordia et al., 2005. See also Lee and
Ready, 1991 on this matter.
24 Augustin et al.
statistically significant at conventional significance levels across different
benchmark models and controls groups. The intra-day evidence suggests
that the options market exhibits unusual buying activity in the period pre-
ceding the SP announcements, while there is less evidence for such activity
in the stock market.
4.6 Does informed trading predict abnormal announcement returns?
If there exists informed trading in the options market, we should observe
a relation between the measures of informed trading extracted from the
options market and the SP CARs. To test this conjecture, we regress the
announcement day CARs on the Sum and Max measures computed from
the options and stock markets.
The results in columns (1) and (5) of Table 7 suggest that only ab-
normal options volume positively predicts CARs with a coefficient that is
statistically significant at the 5% level. The economic magnitude is also
substantial, as the coefficient of 0.02 implies that a one standard devia-
tion increase in the Max measure for options volume is associated with a
2% greater CAR. All other measures are statistically insignificant. The ex-
planatory power of the regression is a modest 2% and 3% in columns (1)
and (5) respectively. In columns (2) and (6), we add OOI to the regres-
sion, which raises the R2 to 3% and 5% respectively, while not introducing
any major change to the coefficient on options volume. This suggests that
the OOI, a measure of net buying activity, may contain additional informa-
tion for SP CARs beyond what is captured by abnormal options volume,
although this could potentially also arise because of a smaller sample. In
columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8), we replicate the previous results and add
several control variables related to the corporate governance, as well as
firm and industry characteristics. Importantly, none of the measures re-
duces the statistical significance of the coefficient for options volume, nor
do they fundamentally change the economic magnitude. Overall, these
results suggest that abnormal options volume in the pre-announcement
period contains information on the CARs of the parent company.
4.7 Informed trading in the CDS and corporate bond markets
In this subsection, we examine informed trading ahead of the corporate
divestiture announcements in both the cash and derivative fixed income
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markets. Thus, we investigate the preferred venue of informed traders
across asset classes. Adopting the same approach as for the equity mar-
ket analysis, we examine measures of informed trading, Sum and Max, as
well as their differences, in our treatment and propensity-matched con-
trol samples. We examine different benchmark models, but irrespective
of which test statistic we consider, the difference between the treatment
and control groups is not statistically significant. Hence, we do not report
them. There appears to be no significant abnormal activity in either the
bond or CDS market before the SP announcement.14
4.8 The “pecking order of informed trading”
We find no evidence of pre-announcement informed trading activity in the
cash or derivatives fixed income market. Despite our limited sample size of
49 events with registered corporate bond transactions ahead of corporate
divestiture announcements, the absence of abnormal pre-announcement
activity may reflect the illiquidity of these markets, especially as TRACE
captures more than 99% of all the secondary market trading activity for
U.S. corporate bonds.
Our conclusion that options are the preferred avenue for informed
traders may perhaps be rationalized by considering the objectives and con-
straints of an informed investor. An informed investor would like to max-
imize their leverage by taking into account a market’s illiquidity and the
associated risk of regulatory detection. For one thing, an informed investor
anticipating a decrease in bond prices would need to short-sell the bond in
order to implement a bearish trade. Shorting bonds can be prohibitively
costly, especially if bonds are “special” (Nashikkar and Pedersen, 2007;
Nashikkar et al., 2011), which can sometimes prevent the elimination of
arbitrage opportunities (Blanco et al., 2005). Although leverage may be
obtained in the CDS market, it involves substantially larger transaction
costs than in the options market. In addition, given the smaller price in-
crease in the parent’s stock price compared to that in a target’s stock price
upon the announcement of an M&A, the leverage argument has greater
importance. Hence, in the case of SP announcements, a “pure” option
strategy may dominate a “mixed” strategy, as is theoretically suggested by
14We also considered examining trading activity, but for the fixed income market, the
limited sample size makes it impossible to study volumes (there is relatively little volume
in bonds), as well as to examine trading volume in CDSs.
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Easley et al., 1998, and by John et al., 2003 in the case of M&A announce-
ments. Even though the stock market is the most liquid market, it may
not be able to “compete” with the options market on a “leverage-adjusted
transaction cost” basis.
We present summary statistics for comparable transaction cost mea-
sures in all four markets in Table 8 (stocks, options, bonds, and CDSs).
The corporate bond market is the most illiquid, with an average trans-
action cost of 185 bps (Friewald et al., 2012).15 Comparing this bid-ask
spread with an effective yield spread of 2.87%, the average bid-ask spread
as a percentage of the average spread is equal to 64%. For the CDS market,
we estimate the average CDS bid-ask spread to be 34 bps, after averaging
across rating groups and portfolio groups as provided by Bongaerts et al.,
2011.16 Comparing this with an average five-year CDS spread level of 327
bps (Lando and Mortensen, 2005) yields a 10% relative bid-ask spread.17
For equity options, Muravyev and Pearson, 2014 report an effective
bid-ask spread of 8.4 cents per share on average. Comparing this bid-ask
spread with their average option price of $1.70 implies a relative bid-ask
spread of 5%.18 These values are consistent with Goyenko et al., 2014,
who report relative bid-ask spreads in the equity options market ranging
from 3.2% for ITM calls to 7.9% for OTM calls. In comparison, the aver-
age effective spread in the stock market is 8 bps, representing an average
relative effective spread of 1.54%.
These rough estimates arguably change across time periods and across
samples. Yet, they suggest a ranking of the magnitudes of transaction
costs. Thus, our findings of informed trading activity in the options mar-
15Friewald et al., 2012 approximate the round-trip cost using Roll’s effective measure
of bid-ask spreads (Roll, 1984). Their estimates range from 24 bps at the 5th percentile
of the distribution to 421 bps at the 95th percentile of the distribution. The standard
deviation is 145 bps.
16Bongaerts et al., 2011 provide, in their Table II, estimates of corporate CDS bid-ask
spreads for portfolios sorted on the size of transaction costs and credit risk. The expected
transaction costs range from 12 basis point for Aaa to Aa rated companies in the low trans-
action cost group, to 1,120 bps for the B to Caa rated companies in the high transaction
costs group.
17Lando and Mortensen, 2005 report average CDS spreads across rating categories
ranging from 26 bps for Aaa ratings to 1,349 bps for Caa-C ratings. The value of 327 bps
is a simple average, based on our calculations.
18This estimate is likely too high, given that the authors propose a correction of the
effective bid-ask spread that implies lower transaction costs. In addition, they show that
transaction costs in the options market have declined over time.
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ket ahead of corporate SP announcements could perhaps be rationalized
by the tradeoff between leverage and liquidity. This would imply a “peck-
ing order of informed trading,” where the options market emerges as the
preferred venue for informed traders.
5 Conclusion
There is widespread anecdotal and academic evidence of informed trad-
ing in financial markets, in particular ahead of M&A announcements. SPs
share many characteristics with M&As, which makes them likely to be sus-
ceptible to insider trading. SPs are unexpected corporate announcements
that precede positive abnormal announcement returns for the parent com-
panies’ stock, and occasionally negative abnormal announcement returns
for their bonds. As the nature of information is clearly identified, these
capital structure announcement effects associated with corporate divesti-
tures provide a unique setting to jointly test for the presence of informed
trading across multiple securities traded on the same firm.
Despite little academic and virtually no regulatory evidence on in-
formed trading ahead of corporate divestitures, we find significant evi-
dence of informed trading in options, but not in stocks, bonds or CDSs,
during the five-day window preceding SP announcements. Our estimates
suggest that about 9% to 16% of all events in our sample exhibit abnormal
options activity in the pre-announcement period. This evidence is appar-
ent in measures of abnormal options volume and excess implied volatility,
which are either unusually large or persistently abnormal. By compar-
ing abnormal activity in the treatment group with a propensity-matched
control group, we effectively apply a differences-in-differences test and
address sample selection and endogeneity concerns. More granular tests
show that the unusual activity in options is greater for call options than
for put options, and that it arises primarily in OTM and ATM call options.
This evidence is confirmed using tick-by-tick data for both stocks and op-
tions markets. Abnormal options volume in the pre-announcement period
positively predicts abnormal announcement returns. In contrast, we find
no evidence of unusual trading activity ahead of the announcements in
the fixed income market.
Our work emphasizes the economically distinct nature of SPs and their
suitability for studies of informed trading across multiple markets. In addi-
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tion, we provide the first examination of the presence of abnormal trading
activity ahead of announcements of corporate SPs in the U.S., in both the
equity (stock and equity options) and the fixed income (bonds and CDSs)
markets. We believe that this analysis is important due to the significant
presence of SP deal activity.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Abnormal Announcement Returns.
Description: In this figure, we depict the distribution of FF3F abnormal announcement
day returns for the sample of 280 unique spinoff events.
Interpretation: The average FF3F abnormal announcement day return is 1.62%. Most of
the abnormal announcement day returns are positive, and the distribution is right-skewed.
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Figure 2: Preliminary Evidence of Pre-Announcement Informed Trading Activity.
Description: In this figure, we depict the pre-announcement informed trading activity in
stocks, options, bonds, and CDS. For stocks, bonds, and CDS, we compute CARs based
on the FF3F benchmark model estimated over the window t ∈ [−252,−21]. For excess
implied volatility, we use a simple market model based on the VIX index as the benchmark.
Interpretation: There are no patterns of abnormal pre-announcement activity in stocks,
bonds, or CDSs. There is evidence of abnormal pre-announcement activity options based
on the run-up in options-implied volatility.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Informed Trading Measures - Max and Sum.
Description: In this figure, we illustrate the distribution of the Sum and Max measures
for options volume. Sum (Max) is measured as the sum (maximum) of all positive stan-
dardized abnormal returns over the five pre-event days, where the normal returns are cal-
culated over the three-month pre-announcement window based on the benchmark model
that includes a constant, day-of-week dummies, lagged returns and volume, contempo-
raneous returns and volume of the market index, lagged values of the dependent and
all independent variables, and the VIX price index. The residuals are then standardized
and the Sum measure is computed as the sum of all positive standardized residuals in the
five-day pre-event window.
Interpretation: The distribution of the Sum and Max measures derived from the informa-
tion on options volume resembles a heavy-tailed distribution with a substantial amount of
weight in the far right tail.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Corporate Spinoffs.
Year SP SP w. Val. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max SIC2 SIC4 Interstate Unique SP
1996 24 14 855 756 53 3,108 13 9 14 23
1997 28 18 2,500 6,131 48 26,625 15 6 14 25
1998 30 19 524 746 3 3,078 15 11 10 27
1999 28 18 6,984 15,924 59 62,156 10 3 10 28
2000 36 19 2,978 4,643 24 18,816 15 4 12 33
2001 15 11 3,242 4,261 24 12,213 8 4 6 15
2002 15 10 268 304 41 1,068 8 3 3 15
2003 10 8 2,236 2,721 42 6,809 3 0 4 9
2004 4 2 657 339 417 897 1 0 1 4
2005 10 5 3,161 3,462 225 8,761 3 2 3 10
2006 9 8 5,839 6,724 1,026 17,963 5 4 4 9
2007 18 15 11,845 29,446 70 107,650 8 5 11 15
2008 18 11 4,950 10,239 4 34,569 7 5 7 18
2009 8 5 667 1,115 144 2,661 4 2 1 8
2010 9 4 2,289 2,089 462 5,132 7 4 3 9
2011 20 10 13,934 17,012 1,174 55,513 9 7 11 19
2012 8 5 1,483 1,535 287 4,056 3 2 4 8
2013 5 4 989 837 122 1,753 2 0 3 5
Total 295 186 4,111 11,541 3 107,650 136 71 121 280
Description: In this table, we summarize all corporate SP announcements in the Thom-
son Reuters SDC Platinum database with a U.S. public parent company for which we could
identify matching stock prices (from CRSP), balance sheet information (from Compustat)
and both options and tick-by-tick price and volume information for stocks (from Option-
Metrics and TAQ), from January 1996 through December 2013. The column SP indicates
the number of announcements per calendar year, while the column SP w.Val. indicates the
subsample for which there exists information on the transaction value in SDC Platinum.
For this subsample, we report the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of
the SP transaction value (in millions of USD). We also report the number of deals in the
same industry, based on the two-digit (SIC2) and 4-digit (SIC4) SIC codes, the number of
divestitures with a parent incorporated in a different state (Interstate), and the number of
unique SP announcement days.
Interpretation: The main analysis is based on 295 SPs announced on 280 unique event
days. The size of the average divestiture is approximately $4.1 billion, with a standard
deviation of $11.5 billion. There are 136 (121) deals whose divested subsidiary is in the
same SIC2 industry (different sate) than the parent company’s headquarters.
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Table 2: Spinoff Average Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event Window τ=0 [-1,0] [-1,1] [-1,3] [-1,5] [-1,10]
Panel A: Average Stock CARs (N = 280)
Market Model 1.74% 1.72% 2.53% 2.05% 1.35% 1.40%
(t-stat) (3.85) (3.94) (4.17) (3.27) (1.98) (1.80)
FF3F 1.62% 1.63% 2.38% 1.68% 0.78% 1.21%
(t-stat) (4.16) (3.73) (4.07) (2.73) (1.44) (1.66)
Panel B: Average Bond CARs - TRACE (N = 49)
FF3F -0.08% 0.27% 0.16% -0.01% 0.05% -0.17%
(t-stat) (-0.40) (0.75) (0.38) (-0.03) (0.09) (-0.19)
Panel C: Average Bond CARs - Datastream (N = 37)
FF3F -0.03% 0.08% 0.24% 0.36% -0.37% -0.33%
(t-stat) (-0.08) (0.41) (0.83) (1.01) (-0.97) (-0.75)
Panel D: Average Bond CARs - Bloomberg (N = 52)
FF3F -0.07% -0.05% -0.18% -0.73% -0.83% -1.18%
(t-stat) (-0.41) (-0.33) (-1.00) (-0.59) (-0.79) (-0.97)
Panel E: Average CDS CARs - Simple Return (N = 54)
FF3F 6.23% 5.84% 5.64% 4.54% 5.35% 6.01%
(t-stat) (2.15) (1.97) (1.79) (1.61) (1.57) (1.77)
Panel F: Average CDS CARs - Clean Price Return (N = 54)
FF3F 4.79% 4.35% 4.61% 3.95% 4.87% 4.59%
(t-stat) (2.07) (1.85) (1.73) (1.49) (1.91) (1.86)
Description: In this table, we present SP announcements average cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) for six different event windows [τ1,τ2]. The number of observations in
each panel is denoted by N . The two different expected return models are the market
model (Market Model) and the Fama-French Three-Factor model (F F3F). The associated
t-statistics, presented in brackets, are adjusted for both cross-sectional and time-series
correlation. The estimation window ([T1, T2]) runs from -252 to -21 calendar days relative
to the announcement day that is defined as day τ= 0. Panel A presents CARs for the entire
sample. In Panels B (C, D), we present CARs for bonds using the TRACE (Datastream,
Bloomberg) database. In Panels E (F), we present CARs for CDS based on simple CDS
returns (“clean” price CDS returns) using the Markit database.
Interpretation: There is evidence of positive economic gains earned by the shareholders
of parent companies upon the announcement of a corporate divestiture due to positive and
statistically significant CARs for stocks. There is mixed evidence of CARs in fixed income
markets, as CARs for bonds (CDSs) are insignificant (positive and significant).
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Table 4: Quantification of Informed Trading.
Panel A: # Treatment Firms with Abn. Opt. Vol., % of Total Sample.
10% signif. level 5% signif. level 1% signif. level
12.14 8.93 3.93
Panel B: # Treatment Firms with Abn. Opt. Vol. in Excess of Matched Firms (%).
10% signif. level 5% signif. level 1% signif. level
Max Sum Max Sum Max Sum
PS1-All 6.79 8.57 4.29 4.64 1.79 1.79
PS2-All 6.07 7.32 3.93 3.93 1.61 1.61
PS1-Options 5.36 4.64 4.29 3.57 1.43 0.71
PS2-Options 6.43 6.43 3.57 3.93 1.61 1.07
Description: In this table, we report the fraction of the sample, in percentage terms, that
exhibits statistically significant abnormal trading volume at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signif-
icance levels, respectively. Panel A reports the number of treatment firms with abnormal
options volume, expressed as a percentage of the total sample. We first calculate the ab-
normal options volume in event days -5 to -1 in excess of the average options volume from
event days -63 to -6 (three months). The cumulative abnormal options volume is the sum
of the abnormal volumes in days -5 to -1. Assuming no serial correlation, the standard
deviation of the cumulative abnormal volume is then
p
5σ, where σ is the standard de-
viation of options volume between days -63 and -6. In Panel B, we report the number of
treatment firms with abnormal options volume in excess of a randomly matched control
group, expressed as a percentage of the total sample, using both the Sum and Max mea-
sures. We report the results for a normal regression model, computed over the 90-day
pre-announcement window to compute normal returns: the conditional model contains
constant, day-of-week dummies, and lagged returns and volume and contemporaneous re-
turns and volume of the market index. It also controls for lagged values of the dependent
and all independent variables and the VIX price index. Standardized residuals are used to
compute the Sum and Max measures. Sum (Max) is measured as the sum (maximum)
of all positive standardized residuals over the five pre-event days. The four control groups
are constructed using the propensity-score matching technique based on the spinoff prob-
ability. We choose the best (PS1), respectively the two best (PS2) matches, for both the
full sample (All) and the sample with options only (Options).
Interpretation: Approximately 9% of all SP events exhibit unusual trading activity in the
pre-announcement period at the 5% statistical significance level. At the 5% significance
level, the number of treatment firms with abnormal options volume in excess of a randomly
matched control group represents about 4%-5% of the total sample.
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Table 5: Abnormal Options Volume by Deal Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Max Sum Max Sum Max Sum
Panel A: Deal Type
Completed (N=214) Withdrawn (N=62) Complet.-Withdr.
PS1-All 0.38 0.51 0.04 0.20 0.35 0.31
(t-stat) (2.91) (2.82) (0.13) (0.55) (1.16) (0.76)
Panel B: Diversified vs. Focused Deals
Same Industry (N=128) Different Industry (N=148) Same-Diff. Industry
PS1-All 0.14 0.17 0.45 0.67 -0.31 -0.50
(t-stat) (0.75) (0.75) (2.86) (2.93) (-1.31) (-1.55)
Panel C: Deal Value
Low Deal Value (N=59) High Deal Value (N=58) Low-High Deal Value
PS1-All 0.27 0.20 0.51 0.87 -0.25 -0.67
(t-stat) (0.93) (0.52) (2.37) (2.74) (-0.69) (-1.34)
Panel D: Deal Distance
Low Distance (N=59) High Distance (N=58) Low-High Distance
PS1-All 0.06 0.35 0.82 1.02 -0.76 -0.68
(t-stat) (0.28) (1.00) (3.11) (2.87) (-2.18) (-1.37)
Panel E: Conglomerate Discount
Low Discount (N=46) High Discount (N=46) Low-High Discount
PS1-All 0.90 1.27 0.47 0.59 0.43 0.69
(t-stat) (3.17) (3.56) (1.68) (1.53) (1.07) (1.30)
(Continued)
Description: In this table, we report the results for the treatment effect, i.e., the differ-
ences in measures of informed trading between the treatment and control groups, using
the Sum and Max measures for aggregate options volume and subsamples stratified by
deal characteristics, using a normal regression model over the 90-day pre-announcement
window to compute normal returns. The conditional model uses a constant, day-of-week
dummies, and the lagged returns and volume and contemporaneous returns and volume
of the market index. It also controls for lagged
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Table 5: (Continued)
Description: values of the dependent and all independent variables and the VIX price
index. For each test, we report the average values separately for the treatment and control
groups, their differences, and the results for the t-test for differences in means. The four
control groups are constructed using the propensity-score matching technique based on
the spinoff probability. We report the best (PS1) matche for the full sample (All). In Panel
A, we separate completed and withdrawn deals. In Panel B, we separate the results for
focused and diversified deals, where a deal is classified as diversified if the parent has a
different two-digit SIC code than the divested firm. In Panel C, we report results for the
bottom and top quintiles of deal size, measured as the transaction value relative to the
parent’s market value of common equity. In Panel , we separate results for the bottom
and top quintiles of geographical distance between the parent and the subsidiary using
the parent and subsidiary zip codes. In Panel E, we separate the results for the bottom and
top terciles of the conglomerate discount, where the conglomerate discount is measured
as the logarithm of the ratio of the sales-weighted average of the Tobin’s q values (ratio
of market value of assets to book value of assets), computed for all industry segments of
the parent firm, to the parent’s observed Tobin’s q. T -test statistics are reported below the
measures of informed trading and are based on standard errors that are corrected for both
cross-sectional and time-series correlation.
Interpretation: There are statistically significant greater measures of unusual options
trading activity in the samples of completed deals, diversified SPs, larger deals, and deals
that are ex ante considered to have a lower conglomerate discount. However, the differ-
ences across groups are not statistically significant, based on the results in columns (5)
and (6).
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Table 6: Empirical Evidence of Informed Trading - Abnormal Order Flow.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat-Control Treat-Control Treat-Control Treat-Control
Max Sum Max Sum
A: Stock Order-Flow Imbalance B: Option Order-Flow Imbalance
PS1-All 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.31
(t-stat) (1.75) (1.73) (2.10) (1.87)
PS2-All 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.28
(t-stat) (1.72) (1.80) (2.10) (2.19)
PS1-Options 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.38
(t-stat) (1.68) (1.25) (1.87) (1.88)
PS2-Options 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.25
(t-stat) (0.85) (0.69) (1.85) (1.74)
Description: In this table, we report the results for the measures of informed trading activ-
ity Sum and Max for the order-flow imbalances in both stock and option volumes. Stock
(option) order-flow imbalance is measured as the net difference between customer buy-
and sell-initiated stock (delta-adjusted option) volume, scaled by the number of shares out-
standing. We fit a normal regression model over the 90-day pre-announcement window to
compute normal returns. The conditional model uses a constant, day-of-week dummies,
and the lagged returns and volume and contemporaneous returns and volume of the mar-
ket index. It also controls for lagged values of the dependent and all independent variables
and the VIX price index. Standardized residuals are used to compute the Sum and Max
measures. Sum (Max) is measured as the sum (maximum) of all positive standardized
residuals over the five pre-event days. For each test, we report the difference in average
values between the treatment and control groups, and the results of a t-test for differences
in means. The four control groups are constructed using the propensity-score matching
technique based on the spinoff probability. We choose the best (PS1), and the two best
(PS2) matches respectively, for both the full sample (All) and the sample with options
only (Options).
Interpretation: Based on intra-day order flows in stocks and options ahead of SP an-
nouncements, there is evidence for unusual buying activity in the options market in the
period preceding the SP announcements, and less evidence for unusual buying activity in
the stock market.
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Table 7: Announcement Return Predictability.
Panel A: Max Measure Panel B: Sum Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept -0.01 0.02 -0.14 0.17 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.45
(-1.01) (0.92) (-0.89) (0.53) (-1.22) (1.17) (-0.59) (1.47)
RETURN 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03∗ -0.01 -0.05∗∗∗
(-0.21) (-0.68) (-0.31) (-1.29) (-0.39) (-1.81) (-0.55) (-2.91)
STOCKVOLUME 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.99) (0.45) (0.63) (0.71) (0.59) (1.24) (0.14) (1.07)
IMPL.VOL 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.01
(0.71) (0.24) (1.35) (0.37) (1.51) (0.43) (1.87) (1.49)
O− VOLUME 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(2.58) (2.77) (2.91) (2.19) (2.45) (2.93) (2.83) (2.44)
SOI 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (-0.53) (0.42) (0.12) (0.27) (-1.89)
OOI 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.02
(0.69) (0.45) (0.99) (0.14)
Industry FE Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
Quarter FE Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø Ø Ø
N 280 90 165 49 280 90 165 49
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.17
(Continued)
Description: In this table, we present estimates of the regression of abnormal SP an-
nouncement stock returns on a constant and the different measures of informed trading
obtained from the stock and the options market using either the Max (Panel A) or the
Sum (Panel B) methodology. Sum (Max) is measured as the sum (maximum) of all pos-
itive standardized abnormal returns over the five pre-event days, where the normal re-
turns are calculated over the three-month pre-announcement window based on a bench-
mark model that includes a constant, day-of-week dummies, the lagged returns and vol-
ume of the market index, and contemporaneous returns and volume of the market index,
lagged values of the dependent and all independent variables, and the VIX price index.
RETURN refers to the Sum and Max measures obtained from abnormal stock returns,
STOCKVOLUME from abnormal stock trading volume, IMPL.VOL from excess implied
volatility, and O− VOLUME from abnormal aggregate options volume. SOI and OOI de-
note the stock and options order-flow imbalances. Controls include: SAME − SIC2, an
indicator equal to one if the parent and divested company have the same two-digit SIC
code; IN T ERSTAT E is equal to one if the spun off company is incorporated in a differ-
ent state to the parent; VALUE, the market value of the divestiture relative to the market
capitalization of the
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Table 7: (Continued)
Description: parent firm; the conglomerate discount DISCOUNT , measured as the log-
arithm of the ratio of the sales-weighted average of the Tobin’s q values (ratio of market
value of assets to book value of assets), computed for all industry segments of the parent
firm, to the parent’s observed Tobin’s q; CONGLOMERATE is equal to one if the par-
ent has multiple business segments with at least one in a different two-digit SIC code
; GOV ERNANCE, the E-index of Bebchuk et al., 2009, computed based on six corpo-
rate governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter
amendments; BLOCK is equal to one if there exists at least one institutional shareholder
that holds more than 5% of the parent’s stock; WAV E equals one if a spinoff occurred in
the same two-digit SIC code in the previous quarter; ASSETS, the natural logarithm of
total assets (TA); MB, the ratio of market-to-book equity; LEV ERAGE is firm leverage;
PPENT , total net property, plant, and equipment divided by TA; EPS, earnings-per-share;
WCAP, the ratio of working capital to TA; RE, retained earnings divided by TA; CASH,
the ratio of cash to TA; CAPX , the ratio of capital expenditure to TA; EMP, the natural
logarithm of the number of employees (measured in thousands). N denotes the number of
observations, R2 is the R-squared of the model. Models (1)-(4) ((5)-(8)) are based on the
Max (Sum) measure of informed trading. All specifications include industry and quarter
fixed effects (FE). ∗ ∗ ∗ (∗∗, ∗) denotes significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Interpretation: Only abnormal options volume positively predicts CARs with a statistically
significant coefficient at the 5% level. The coefficient of 0.02 implies that a one standard
deviation increase in the Max measure for options volume is associated with a 2% greater
CAR. All other measures are statistically insignificant.
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Table 8: Transaction Costs.
Market Transaction Costs (bps/cents) Relative Transaction Costs (%)
Bond 185 64
CDS 34 10
Options 8.4 5
Stock 8 1.54
Description: This table provides the average transaction costs on an absolute (either in
bps or in cents) and on a relative (as a percentage of the underlying) basis for the stock,
options, CDS, and corporate bond markets. Values for the corporate bond market are from
Friewald et al., 2012. We use values for the CDS market from Bongaerts et al., 2011 and
Lando and Mortensen, 2005. Metrics for the equity options and stock markets are from
Muravyev and Pearson, 2014 and Goyenko et al., 2014.
Interpretation: Transaction costs are lower in the equity market than in the fixed income
market. While stocks have lower relative transaction costs than options, options provide
greater leverage than stocks.
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A Proof for Statistical Inference of Treatment Effects
For each variable X i,t , where i is event subscription and t is the event day
relative to the SP announcement day, the standardized residuals during
the five-day pre-event window follow i.i.d. standard normal distributions
N(0, 1). Define Max i = max{X i,−1, ...,X i,−5}. Note that:
(Max i < x) = (max{X i,−1, ...,X i,−5}< x) = (X i,−1 < x , ...X i,−5 < x)
=
−5⋂
k=−1
(X i,k < x).
So the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Max i is:
F(x) = P(Max i < x) = P(
−5⋂
k=−1
(X i,k < x)) =
−5∏
k=−1
Φ(x) = Φ5(x),
where Φ(x) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Royston, 1982
provides an approximation for the expectation of the rth normal order
variable out of n variables as −Φ−1( r−0.375n+0.25 ). With r = 1 and n = 5, the
expected value of Max i is 1.18. Also note that:
Var(Max i) = Var(max{X i,−1, ...,X i,−5})≤
−5∑
k=−1
Var(X i,k) = 5.
The treatment effect is the difference between the Max i of the SP firm
and that of the control firm. Since Max i is i.i.d in the treatment and con-
trol groups, the expectation of the treatment effect is zero and the vari-
ance is less than twice the variance of Max i , 10. Given the well-defined
mean and limited variance, the treatment effect on Max i converges to a
normal distribution with zero mean under Lindeberg-Levy Central Limit
Theory (CLT). A Student’s t-test with unknown variance can therefore be
performed on the mean treatment effect.
Define Sumi =
−5∑
t=−1
max{0,X i,t} =
−5∑
t=−1
X i,t+|X i,t |
2 . The expectation of
Sumi is calculated as:
E[Sumi] = E[
−5∑
t=−1
X i,t + |X i,t |
2
] =
5
2
E[X i,t] = 5
∫ +∞
0
x
1p
2pi
e− x
2
2 dx =
5
2pi
≈ 1.99,
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and the variance is:
Var(Sumi) = E[Sum
2
i ]− (E[Sumi])2 = E[(
−5∑
t=−1
X i,t + |X i,t |
2
)2]− ( 5
2pi
)2
=
5
2
E[(X i,t)
2] +
C25
2
E[|X1||X2|]− 25
pi
=
5
2
+
10
pi
− 25
pi
≈ 1.70.
The treatment effect on Sumi is the difference of Sumi between the SP
firm and the matched control firm. Therefore, the expectation of the treat-
ment effect is zero and the variance is twice the variance of Sumi . Under
Lindeberg-Levy CLT, the treatment effect on Sumi also converges to a nor-
mal distribution with zero mean and we can test the sample mean using
the Student’s T -test.
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Table A-1: Summary Statistics of Characteristics for Treatment and Control Groups.
Treatment Control
All Deals Parents with Traded Options
PS0 PS1 PS2 PS1 PS2
CONGLOMERATE 0.493 0.514 -0.021 0.516 -0.023 0.543 -0.050 0.536 -0.041
DISCOUNT 0.146 0.163 -0.017 0.126 0.020 0.127 0.019 0.128 0.020
GOV ERNANCE 9.283 9.082 0.201 9.139 0.144 9.258 0.025 9.275 0.001
BLOCK 0.671 0.636 0.036 0.643 0.029 0.675 -0.004 0.670 0.004
WAV E 0.321 0.336 -0.014 0.359 -0.038 0.346 -0.025 0.350 -0.030
ASSETS 8.395 8.311 0.084 8.323 0.073 8.251 0.144 8.263 0.127
MB 1.623 1.698 -0.083 1.661 -0.465 1.709 -0.116 1.675 -0.041
LEV ERAGE 0.308 0.296 0.017 0.298 0.007 0.300 -0.001 0.290 0.012
PPENT 0.244 0.273 -0.029 0.259 -0.015 0.253 -0.009 0.246 -0.003
EPS 0.332 0.319 0.012 0.389 -0.057 0.290 0.042 0.316 0.015
WCAP 0.143 0.165 -0.022 0.166 -0.023 0.137 0.005 0.145 -0.001
RE 0.015 0.110 -0.095∗ 0.092 -0.077∗ 0.104 -0.089∗∗ 0.110 -0.094∗∗
CASH 0.028 0.030 -0.002 0.031 -0.002 0.023 0.005 0.024 0.004
CAPEX 0.013 0.014 -0.001 0.014 -0.001 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000
EMP 9.221 9.201 0.020 9.188 0.032 9.196 0.025 9.188 0.032
RET 0.026 0.060 -0.034 0.055 -0.029 0.036 -0.010 0.031 -0.003
VOLAT I LI TY 0.436 0.454 -0.017 0.449 -0.013 0.449 -0.013 0.457 -0.021
TURNOV ER 0.773 0.722 0.051 0.702 0.071 0.799 -0.026 0.797 -0.025
(Continued)
Description: In this table, we compare the sample characteristics of the treatment (PS0)
and propensity-matched control groups (PS1 and PS2). PS1 (PS2) defines the control
group using the first best match (first two best matches), constructed either from the entire
SP population, or from the subsample of deal-quarters with options. CONGLOMERATE
is a dummy variable equal to one if the parent has multiple business segments of which at
least one has a different two-digit SIC code than the parent company; DISCOUNT denotes
the conglomerate discount measured as the logarithm of the ratio of the sales-weighted
average of the industry-median Tobin’s q values (ratio of market value of assets to book
value of assets), computed for all industry segments of the parent firm, to the parent’s
observed Tobin’s q; GOV ERNANCE is the E-index of Bebchuk et al., 2009, computed based
on six corporate governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers
and charter amendments; BLOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if there is at least
one institutional shareholder that holds more than 5% of the parent’s stock; WAV E is a
dummy variable that equals one if a spinoff occurred in the same two-digit SIC code in the
previous quarter; ASSETS denotes the natural logarithm of total assets; MB is the ratio
of market-to-book equity; LEV ERAGE is firm leverage; PPENT is defined as total net
property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; EPS denotes earnings-per-share;
WCAP is the ratio of working capital to total assets; RE is retained earnings divided by total
assets; CASH is the ratio of cash to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditure
to total assets; EMP is the natural logarithm of the number of employees (measured in
thousands). All balance sheet variables are lagged by one quarter relative to the quarter
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Table A-1: (Continued)
Description: of the spinoff announcement. RET is the parent’s past quarter’s stock price
performance, measured as the sum of the past quarter’s log stock returns; VOLAT I LI TY
denotes the past quarter’s equity volatility, measured as the annualized standard deviation
of the past quarter’s daily returns; TURNOV ER is defined as the average trading volume
divided by the number of shares outstanding in the previous quarter. ∗ ∗ ∗ (∗∗, ∗) denotes
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Interpretation: The sample characteristics of the treatment group are not significantly dif-
ferent from those of the propensity-matched control groups, suggesting that the treatment
and control groups are well matched.
